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Peace Work by Civil Actors in  
Post-Communist Societies 
 
 
   Diana Francis and Norbert Ropers 
 
 
 
Since the momentous events of 1989/90, the pattern of conflict in Europe has 
changed for good. Inevitably, the forms, institutions, and mechanisms for dealing 
with conflicts have also changed, although constructive intervention is still far 
outpaced by the dynamics of conflict. The concepts of peace policy and peace work 
have had new life breathed into them. One feature that has assumed especial 
importance is the debate about the actors involved in these domains: How can the 
role of multilateral actors in preventive diplomacy, in intervention in acute conflicts, 
and in the consolidation of peace be strengthened? Does the ethnopolitical 
character of the conflicts between majorities and minorities in the crisis regions of 
Europe not necessitate the creation of a new type of multi-ethnic state — one that 
radically calls into question the nation-state concept that has prevailed up to now? 
Should not actors at the social level be involved in putting peace policy into 
practice, as well as those at the state governmental level? In what capacities can 
internal and external actors aid the process of constructive conflict management? 
How important are human-rights groups, ‘fact-finding’ and crisis-intervention 
missions, humanitarian organizations, non-violent campaigns, and intervenors from 
outside? 
The following paper addresses the whole gamut of peace tasks and roles 
confronting civil actors in the post-communist societies of Central and Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union. We work on the assumption that the current 
ethnopolitical movements and conflicts are an expression of a massive change in 
the pace of development and of a drastic redistribution of opportunities and 
  2 
chances to participate. For this process of ‘civilization’ to take place, many different 
actors and forces—political and social, party and non-party, domestic and external 
— must be involved. Given the meagre resources usually available, ‘the more the 
better’ is not good counsel here. A preferable course is to identify strategic priorities 
and alliances for peace work in societies undergoing transformation. 
The civil actors highlighted here are all those persons and groups of persons 
working from outside the governmental sphere for the nonviolent conduct and 
resolution of ethnopolitical conflicts. In contrast to what is implied in the usual 
distinction between state and societal areas of operation, the civil area in this sense 
can also include the staff of state or semi-state institutions — for example, members 
of parliament or those working in research and educational establishments, in state 
enterprises, and in regional and local authorities. Because of the political wrangling 
over privatization and the market economy, the continuing influence of the 
nomenclatura networks, and the infiltration of a number of administrative spheres 
and economic sectors by mafia-like groups, the distinction between state and 
societal structures will continue to be a blurred one for a long time to come in many 
post-communist societies. Precisely because of this, those individuals working for 
democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and non-military conflict resolution from 
within state structures merit special attention. 
In 1996, in the light of experience with the implementation of the Dayton 
Accord in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the significance of civil actors began to be discussed 
more widely. The attempt by governments and multilateral institutions to impose 
the precarious combination of a Serb-Croat-Muslim condominium with mono- and 
bi-ethnic governmental structures can only succeed if civil groups lend it legitimacy. 
But what about the relationship between those who, because of the violence and 
injustice they have suffered, see the best solution as lying in autonomy, self-
determination, and separation, and those who back the idea of reconciliation and 
the creation of multi-ethnic policies? Often it is precisely these two camps that are 
ranged in sceptical, if not hostile, opposition to one another. 
Peace work is often automatically equated with the bridging of differences, 
with rapprochement and mutual understanding. In the context of ethnopolitical 
crises, the notion is also widespread that the prime concern of civil actors should be 
impartiality, in order to prevent such conflicts from escalating. But are there not, 
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precisely in these kinds of disputes, situations in which what is required is support 
for the weaker side — if ist cause seems just, in other words: partiality? The tension 
between ‘associative’ and dissociative’ peace-strategies which was described by 
Johan Galtung as far back as the 1970s has up to now been interpreted primarily as 
something relating only to state-based peace-policy. But it is also relevant to civil 
actors. The theoretical observations and practical examples that follow here are 
based on reports from training-sessions and workshops conducted with actors from 
post-communist countries, notably within the framework of a ‘support project’ for 
indigenous peace-workers financed in 1995/6 as part of the European Union’s 
‘PHARE/TACIS Democracy Programme’.1 
 
 
 
 
1 Democratization as a Transformation of Conflict Culture2 
 
 
The democratic upheaval in the eastern part of Europe has radically altered the 
peace agenda. The introduction of pluralist political systems and the ousting of at 
least some sections of the old élites by new ascendant groups has meant that the 
repressive-cum-bureaucratic approach to resolving conflict has been superceded by 
a ‘transitional conflict-culture’. This is characterized, on the one hand, by a strong 
continuing trend to authoritarian patterns of conflict resolution, particularly on the 
part of government bodies; on the other hand, by the new institutions embodying 
parliamentary democracy, the rule of law, and economic/political competition which 
are increasingly necessitating the creation of other mechanisms for balancing 
interests. 
                                                          
1 This project is being conducted jointly by the Berghof Center of Constructive Conflict Management (Berlin), the 
Institute  of Ethnology and Anthropology at the Russian Academy of Sciences (Moskow), and International Alert 
(London). 
2 By this term mean social norms, patterns and attitudes in relation to conflict. 
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In practice, three basic paradigms of conflict culture are observable, and the 
relative weightings between them provide an indication of the degree of success of 
the reform process. The first is, in some sense, an extension of the practice of 
communist party leaderships, whereby differences of interest between various 
groups exercising influence were kept within manageable bounds through barter, 
compromise, and the redefinition and accentuation of shared overall interests. 
Typical this took the form of, on the one hand admitting the differences, but holding 
the negotiations behind closed doors, or, on the other hand, the practice of coming 
to secret accommodations whilst averring unanimity of interests to the outside 
world. This was the approach used by President Yeltsin in 1995/6, as part of his dual 
strategy of containing strategic élites within the internal power-apparatus whilst 
externally projecting the impression of a populist levelling of differences of 
interests. 
The second paradigm consists of open competition and co-operative solutions 
between various interest-groups, whether in the form of elections or of 
institutionalized negotiating-processes, including procedures based on the rule of 
law. The differences are brought into the open and acknowledged as legitimate. The 
aim is either unequivocal majority-decision or overt agreement as to how the 
interests of divergent groups are to be reconciled. In many post-communist 
societies, however, the preconditions for this kind of democratic liberal conflict-
culture — namely, a stable economic base, established procedures and forums for 
resolving differences, an acceptance of heterogeneity, plurality, and, above all, the 
‘rules of the game’ — are only at a very rudimentary stage of development. Their 
further evolution is also rendered more difficult by the sharp polarization between 
— to put it in simplified terms — the winners and losers of modernization, as 
emerged, for example, in the Russian presidential elections of 1996 between Yeltsin 
and Zyuganov. 
Apart from the ethnopolitical tensions, it is this opposition between the 
winners and losers of modernization which represents the greatest challenge to 
internal peace in the societies undergoing transformation. And yet the civil actors 
involved in this area — from the trade unions, at their various stages of 
development, to the newly created commercial and professional associations — are 
seldom viewed from a peace-work perspective. Neglect of their peacemaking 
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function and potential is possibly one of the reasons why ethnic loyalties and 
affinities have instead assumed exaggerated importance. 
It is in this area — that of ethnopolitical tensions — that the third paradigm of 
transitional conflict-culture is mostly to be found. Here, differences are often fought 
out in an especially ruthless and uncompromising way. They point to a long prior 
history, which not infrequently involves deep historic wounds and claims on both 
sides. Such differences are at great risk of being resolved by violent means. Why the 
post-communist world in particular should suffer from this type of conflict is a 
question that has been subjected to repeated analysis since the changes.3 Key 
factors that might be cited here are: the way in which the civil rights movement in 
many countries outside Russia was linked to the struggle for liberation from Soviet 
domination; the particular type of “ethnic engineering” within the Soviet Union; the 
tendency, in times of transition and crisis, to turn to supposedly primeval loyalties 
and affinities; the calculations of political leaders, who use ethnic membership as a 
tool in the struggle for power and in economic competition; and of course, last but 
not least, genuine injustices/the safeguarding of privileges, and the failure to work 
through the conflict when it ocurred before. 
Less attention has been devoted to the question of how far the post-
communist legacy also offers a basis for a constructive conflict-culture in the 
democratic liberal sense previously mentioned. And yet there are a fair number of 
examples of ethnopolitical tensions having been successfully resolved — as in the 
peaceful partition of Czechoslovakia in 1993, or the bilateral treaties concluded in 
1994/5 between the Russian federal government and a number of republics within 
the Russian Federation. As far as mobilizing civil actors is concerned, the legacy is 
ambivalent: on the one hand, the high levels of education and training in all the 
communist countries resulted in the build-up of a large pool of people who are, in 
principle, qualified for this task; on the other hand, enforced membership of various 
‘mass organizations’ has not exactly increased the motivation to involve oneself 
voluntarily in efforts to achieve particular political/social ends. The chances of 
seeing civil-society structures develop are clearly at their best in those places where 
a broadly based civil rights movement existed before the changes — for example, in 
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Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, three countries in which, incidentally, the 
revolutionary potential of ‘civil society’ was recognized at an early stage by 
dissidents. 
Civil society movements, albeit often comprising no more than small, poorly 
resourced non-governmental organizations (NGOs), now exist in all the post-
communist countries.  Their development has been fostered to an important extent 
by support programmes organized by American foundations or the European Union, 
and also through co-operative projects conducted with Western and international 
NGOs. An important role is played here by training and advisory projects aimed at 
fostering the development of political/social organizations, and by training sessions 
in which potential multipliers are introduced to the styles of communication and 
interaction current in humanistic psychology, and in which the methods and skills of 
participative group-leadership and constructive conflict regulation are passed on. 
In this way, there has emerged, within a relatively short period of time, a 
transnational ‘NGO market’ — albeit of modest proportions — which has also 
opened up career opportunities for civil actors in the new democracies. An example 
of this kind of development is the activity engaged in by the US-initiated NGO 
network ‘Partners for Democratic Change’ (San Francisco) under the programmatic 
rubric ‘Building a Culture of Conflict Resolution in Emerging Democracies’. On the 
basis of experiences in multi-ethnic community-work and mediation in California, 
seven national centres have now been established as part of this network in Central 
and Eastern Europe, with the aim of disseminating various forms of co-operative 
conflict regulation and its attendant skills.  The training sessions in communication, 
negotiation, and problem-solving organized by the centres have been attended by 
thousands of future multipliers. What is more, with the help of the centres, ‘ethnic 
conciliation commissions’ have been successfully set up and trained. 
Despite all the commendable contributions it makes towards civilizing conflict 
cultures, the spread of this kind of Western-initiated training-infrastructure does, it 
                                                                                                                                                           
3 Cf. for the former Soviet Union the comprehensive study by Valery Tishkov: Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in 
and after the Soviet Union. A Mind Aflame. London et.al. 1997. 
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must be said, also suffer from a number of weaknesses. These can be summarized 
under four heads:4 
 
• Most of the activities consist of one-off short programmes (lasting one to two 
weeks), in which mainly Western, English-speaking trainers pass on 
generalized knowledge, abilities, and skills.  It would, however, be better if 
advanced training were designed to take place over a longer period and 
conducted in parallel with the work or project concerned; if native experts 
were involved in the design and implementation of the sessions and local 
trainers trained for future work; and, last but not least, if the sessions were 
conducted in the language of the country concerned. 
• Developing structures of civil society is a great deal easier in urban, and 
especially political, centres than on the social periphery. This gap is 
accentuated by the fact that training events are focused on a circle of 
individuals with international contacts based in the centres. In choosing the 
target groups, more account should therefore be taken of geographical range. 
• Because of the administrative requirements associated with them, the long 
period of preparation they require, and the desire to maintain control, support 
programmes run by Western foundations exercise a de facto preference for 
projects put forward by Western proposers/project leaders, who do not 
always fit the bill for the particular region. In addition, it is often easier to 
obtain funds for training than for projects in which the skills acquired can be 
put to practical use. One example is the disproportion between the funds 
raised for training prospective members of ‘ethnic conciliation committees’ 
and those available to NGOs wishing to run reconciliation projects at a local 
level. A positive counter-example is the decentralized structure of the Soros 
Foundation, most of whose staff in Eastern Europe are themselves recruited 
from the national NGO scene. 
                                                          
4 This summary is based on a survey amongst 56 civil actors conducted by Anja Weiss and Aleksej Nazarenko as 
part of the previously mentioned ‘Support Project’ in 1995.  See Anja Weiss: Insider NGOs as a key to developing 
peace constituencies in the new Eastern democracies, in: Peace and Security XXIX (March 1997), 37 - 45. 
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• After the rhetoric of class war, the ‘win-win problem-solving’ formulas of 
conflict regulation, as propagated by many trainers, have fallen on extremely 
fertile ground. What has often been overshadowed in all this is that, in cases 
where the power relations in a conflict are asymmetrical and conflict forums 
have not been sufficiently institutionalized, the mere passing-on of these 
methods cannot of itself guarantee constructive handling of conflict. Civilizing 
conflict culture is by no means merely a question of individual capacity to deal 
with conflict. 
 
The first three of these criticisms have now begun to be addressed in several 
countries, and have led to the development of independent advisory and training 
structures. The Bulgarian NGO world, for example, managed early on to emancipate 
itself from some of its American sponsors. The indigenous ‘Foundation for 
Negotiation and Conflict Resolution’ in Sofia is now in a position to conduct fairly 
long-term education projects in the multi-ethnic regions of Bulgaria and to offer 
training sessions in conflict resolution in neighbouring countries as well. Another 
trend is that of the gradual emergence of a profit-oriented market for conflict-
resolution services, either for private companies or for public administrations.  Many 
NGOs see this as offering them a chance to subsidize their peace-making activities 
through the provision of commercial services. 
 
2 Nurturing and Containing Conflicts 
 
 
The danger of a domestic conflict escalating to the level of organized violence is 
particularly great where the distribution of basic opportunities is involved or there is 
an uneven satisfaction of basic needs. It might be economic advantages and 
disadvantages or the right to cultural identity or political self- or co-determination 
that is at issue. Such factors acquire added significance at times of crisis or change, 
when real or perceived inequalities and injustices are judged to exist between 
ethnically defined groups. In the eastern part of Europe and in the former Soviet 
Union, it is usually in majority – minority relationships that this kind of potential for 
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conflict is expressed. Such relationships are particularly explosive when 
disadvantaged national minorities form a majority of the population locally or 
regionally, as is the case, for example, with the Albanians in Kosovo, whose basic 
rights to cultural identity and participation in political decision-making has been 
denied them. 
In such cases, peace work is on the one hand faced with the task of containing 
intense conflicts in such a way that they can be worked through non-violently; on 
the other hand, in relationships involving highly asymmetrical and unfair 
distribution, it may be their job to reinforce or support the weaker side’s capacity for 
conflict. Hence peace work should not be automatically equated with the de-
escalation of conflicts. Where there is extreme discrimination and handicap, a 
settlement can generally be achieved only when the conflict has been brought into 
the open and the stronger party has been confronted with the concerns of the 
weaker side. In this sense, all the improvements in the protection of minorities 
which have occurred since 1990 within the framework of the C/OSCE have been due 
in no small measure to the improved capacity for conflict of the minorities’ 
representatives and those championing their cause. 
However, anyone seeking to reinforce the capacity for conflict of oppressed 
and disadvantaged ethnic groups by means of peace-based argumentation faces 
two challenges: first, the seemingly inevitable correlation between the escalation of 
a conflict and the increased tendency to violence; and second, the possibility of the 
conflict’s becoming further ethnicized. Nevertheless, a number of factors militate in 
favour of engaging with these dangers in a preventive way. If one works on the 
premise that, sooner or later, most unfair distributions will come under great 
pressure to be politicized, then these effects will, in any case, have to be reckoned 
with. But identifying them in good time could make it easier to link them with 
nonviolent forms of struggle. 
Peace work should therefore be differentiated according to the particular 
phase of the conflict that has been reached. Or, to put it another way: constructive 
transformation of a conflict requires different concepts of peaceful intervention 
depending on the overall conditions and the forms of conflict involved.  Four phases 
should be distinguished—though these should not be viewed as an unvarying, one-
dimensional succession of clearly demarcated stages.  The dynamics of a conflict 
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are determined by a multiplicity of actors at different levels, the individual and not 
infrequently contradictory developments build up into unforeseen trends. In the 
case of protracted conflicts there is, in addition, a tendency to interpret reversion to 
a phase prior to open conflict as success. 
 
 
2.1 Engagement and response in situations of latent and suppressed conflict 
 
In this phase, there is manifest disadvantage to, and discrimination against, a 
particular group, which my be defined in terms of ethnicity, language or religion. The 
possibilities which this group has to defend itself against such treatment are 
minimal, either because of oppression by the majority party or parties, or because of 
poor internal mobilization. A typical example is the situation of the Roma, who 
overall, in terms of population, form the largest ethnic minority in Central and 
Eastern Europe. Although there are now a range of civil actors representing the 
Roma’s interests, they are highly fragmented, rivalry far outweighs any efforts at 
coalition-building, and their impact within the Roma population remains slight. 
Peace work amongst such disadvantaged groups means first and foremost 
education and training — “conscientization” in Paolo Freire`s sense — and helping 
them to improve their socio-economic conditions. Only in combination with these 
things can an increased capacity for organization and solidarity be achieved.  
Externally, there has to be a parallel process of public-awareness work, human-
rights monitoring, crisis intervention in favour of the minority, and ideally also 
action to highlight the majority group’s own long-term interest in advancing the 
cause of the minority. 
An example of this kind of work is the activity of the Bucharest—based NGO 
‘Rromani CRISS: The Roma Center for Social Intervention and Studies’. This body is 
geared mainly to developing and supporting social-work projects designed both to 
bring about some concrete improvement in the situation of the Roma community in 
Romania and at the same time to enhance their self-awareness/self-confidence, 
their awareness of their rights, and their sense of collective responsibility. It also 
documents the situation of the Romanian Roma and works to ensure that they are 
presented in a non-discriminatory way in the media, to prevent and investigate local 
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pogroms against them, and to secure the introduction of measures that will stabilize 
multi-ethnic communities. 
 
 
2.2 Engagement and response in situations of “no violence”/“minimal 
violence” 
 
In this phase, the weaker parties are in a position to articulate their interests and 
views; there is a political agenda — e.g. in the form of claims to individual and 
collective minority-rights, to autonomy, or to a fair share in the exploitation of the 
country’s resources; actors with conflict strategies of a more or less radical kind 
emerge. Mobilization also occurs on the side of the majority party/parties. Quite 
often, these parties are part of the driving force, because they are seeking to 
safeguard privileges or to exploit the conflict for other purposes. The use or threat 
of violence does in certain circumstances play a role in the parties’ calculations, or 
may do so in situations of acute confrontation, but it does not at this stage 
constitute a systematically planned component of the conflict. 
In this situation, peace work comprises a kind of dual strategy of 
simultaneously bolstering the weaker side and fostering shared structures and 
loyalties. The former component includes: monitoring human-rights deficiencies; 
campaigning for the extension of minority rights; and reinforcing minority 
representation. The latter includes: dismantling barriers to communication and 
reflecting on mutual stereotypes, such as enemy images; fostering day-to-day multi-
ethnic links; and supporting direct conflict resolution. 
The Helsinki groups, which mostly emerged at the time of the old civil-rights 
movements, have made a crucial contribution to the development of an active 
lobby-scene working for the protection of minorities. In many countries, they 
managed — as did the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights in Poland — to go 
beyond monitoring and early warning and actually influence governmental 
initiatives in this area.  An example of work towards the establishment of a multi-
ethnic polity is provided by the efforts of the Center for Minority Rights in Vojvodina 
(Serbia). At the time that the conflict with Croatia was escalating, and later also in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, its representatives worked to maintain peaceful co-existence 
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between the various ethnic groups in its region, through public-awareness work, 
round tables, seminars, and mutual support amongst those who had undertaken to 
work in this field. 
 
 
2.3 Engagement and response in situations of ”violence” 
 
In terms of consequences produced, the most crucial juncture in the escalation of a 
conflict is undoubtedly the transition to organized violence. At a stroke, there are 
scores of additional grounds for the conflict; the whole spectrum of people who up 
to then have tried to counter the friend/foe configurations are now forced into 
polarized positions; those in possession of military power acquire increasing control 
over the dynamics of the conflict, and the civil forces withdraw into the background. 
In overall conditions such as these, peace work is aimed chiefly at bringing 
the violence to an end, either by exerting direct influence on the warring parties, by 
engaging in public-awareness work and organizing protest meetings, and 
occasionally also by mounting spectacular non-violent actions in the crisis-areas. In 
practice, however, it is humanitarian help for the victims of the war that occupies 
centre-stage, together with attempts to contain the violence at local level or to 
maintain contact across front lines. Direct work on the underlying conflict, 
meanwhile, diminishes in importance—even though it can, in the form of shuttle 
diplomacy, pre-negotiations, and workshops with third parties, undoubtedly play a 
major role in fostering rapprochement at the leadership level. 
The involvement of civil actors in this phase is illustrated by various Russian, 
Serbian, and Croatian NGOs. Thus, since 1994, following the outbreak of war in 
Chechnia, the Moscow groups ‘Nonviolence International—Newly Independent 
States’ and ‘OMEGA — Organization of Missions for Ethnic Harmonization’ have 
been organizing fact-finding missions, with a view to putting pressure on the 
Russian government via public opinion, and have helped organize aid for the 
affected population. Because of poorly defined leadership-structures and goals in 
the Russian armed forces, they were also able to negotiate provisional local 
ceasefires, to facilitate the withdrawal of civilians, and to encourage the exchange of 
prisoners. The Russian human-rights and welfare organization ‘Order of Charity and 
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Protection’ combined support for children affected by the 1992 outbreak of violence 
between Ossetians and Ingushetians in the North Caucasus with initiatives aimed at 
mobilizing local women’s organizations and indigenous leaders against the 
expulsions and ethnic attacks. 
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2.4 Engagement and response in “post-violence” situations 
 
The experiences in former Yugoslavia following the signing of the Dayton Accord at 
the end of 1995 have shown that political solutions — particularly when they have 
come about chiefly as a result of pressure from external powers — are not in 
themselves sufficient to set a lasting peace-making process in motion. Even if the 
political framework proves durable, it still depends on civil actors to breathe life into 
it. And what is involved here is not just the huge task of rebuilding the country 
materially and of making the shift to a peace-time economy, but also the extremely 
difficult issues of the (re)integration of refugees, war victims, and military 
personnel, as well as the whole complex of problems associated with achieving 
reconciliation between the parties to the war. Two crucial challenges are, first, 
finding a balance between dissociative and associative principles in (re)constructing 
communities and political entities, and, second, ensuring that the violent past is 
worked through both individually and collectively. 
For a long time, this last aspect was not given either the practical or 
theoretical attention it deserved. And yet there are many indications that the 
repression and denial of the memory of violent experiences on the part both of 
victims and of perpetrators can act as the germ for new conflicts. Of course, in 
working through the violent past, the principles of truth, justice, and responsibility 
— both collective and individual — must be balanced against those of the 
maintenance of peace, and of forgiveness and reconciliation. This cannot only be a 
matter of individual criminal justice at the international level, as, for example, in the 
war-crimes tribunal relating to the former Yugoslavia in The Hague — however 
important this is as a step in transnational civilization.  It must also embrace the 
social successor-organizations of those groups that have used or suffered violence. 
Clinical experience in general psycho-social work with victims of violence 
(dealing with ‘post-traumatic stress syndrome’ — PTSD) is now being reflected in 
peace work in post-war societies—e.g. in the care of refugees, former interns, 
victims of torture, and women who have suffered rape. The Georgian refugee-
organization ‘Association of Displaced Women from Abkhazia’ concentrated on the 
care of children who had suffered direct violence either personally or within their 
family. Building on these experiences, a similar, multilateral project was set up, 
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under the direction of a Bulgarian NGO, and as part of this, children from both sides 
of the Georgian – Abkhazian conflict were invited to a summer camp in Bulgaria in 
1996. 
An indirect approach to social rehabilitation is being pursued by a group of 
psychologists and educationists from Serbia who have come together to form the 
‘Group MOST for Cooperation and Mediation of Conflicts’, a member-organization of 
the Belgrade-based ‘Center for Anti-war Action’. They have developed school 
materials and study-programmes encouraging a reflective approach to nationalist 
tendencies in Serbia’s political system and a constructive approach to ethnic 
differences. Their ‘Good Will Classroom’ programme, which contains some elements 
of training in non-violent conflict resolution for schoolchildren, aspires to be applied 
within the official school-system and therefore lays greater stress on social than on 
intercultural learning since this is a more acceptable formulation for the state 
authorities. 
 
 
 
 
3 Internal and External Conflicts 
 
 
The previously hotly debated question of whether peace policy and peace work 
should be aimed primarily at influencing political leaderships or at increasing 
awareness among the population has now given way to an understanding that both 
are needed. Typical of the present debate about peaceful intervention in internal, 
ethnopolitical disputes is a paradigm developed by the American conflict-researcher 
John Paul Lederach.5 Lederach distinguishes three hierarchical levels and regards 
specific kinds of intervention-strategy as being required at each level. The three 
levels are: the top level leadership, leaders at the middle level, and leaders at the 
grassroots level. 
                                                          
5 John Paul Lederach: Building Peace. Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies. Tokyo: UN University 1994. 
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TYPES OF ACTORS
Level 1: Top Leadership
- Military / political leaders 
  with high visibility 
Level 2: Middle Range Leaders
- Leaders respectet in sectors 
- Ethnic /religious leaders
- Academics/ intellectuals
- Humanitarian leaders (NGOs)
Level 3: Grassroots Leaders
- Local leaders
- Leaders of indigenous NGOs
- Community developers
- Local health officials 
- Refugee camp leaders
- Local peace  commissions
- Grassroots  training 
- Prejudice reduction
- Psychosocial  work
  in post-war  trauma 
APPROACHES TO
BUILDING PEACE
- Focus on high-level
  negotiations
- Emphasis on ceasefire
- Led by highly visible 
  single  personality
- Problem-solving 
  workshops
-Training in conflict
  resolution
- Peace commissions
- Insider-partial teams 
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Figure 1: Actors and Peacebuilding Foci Across the Affected Population 
 
 Source: John Paul Lederach: Building Peace. Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies. 
Tokyo: UN University 1994, p. 16. 
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This — undoubtedly important — emphasis on the vertical dimension means that 
horizontal differentiation fades somewhat from view. This can lead to the 
impression that the parties to the conflict constitute homogeneous social entities, 
and that peace work consists mainly in directing the escalation of the conflict into 
civil channels as it proceeds — depending on your point of view — from the top 
downwards or from the bottom upwards (or from Lederach´s point of view from the 
middle up and down). The fact that there are a multiplicity of different actors within 
the conflict-spectrum, each with their own positions, interests, and preferences in 
terms of coalitions, fades into the background (Fig. 1). This is most obvious where 
there is great dissension within one camp about the way in which a conflict is to be 
resolved with the other side — as is the case, for example, in Israel, since the Rabin 
and Perez governments have been backing the idea of an understanding with the 
PLO. In conditions such as these, the thesis that there will not be a lasting peace 
between Israelis and Palestinians until both the Israeli and Palestinian sides are 
reconciled amongst themselves appears a well-founded one. 
The notion — widespread in the classical literature on conflict — that 
escalation will result in greater unity and centralization within each of the affected 
groups, needs to be modified in view of the complex situation in which societies 
undergoing transformation find themselves. Although extremist parties and 
leaderships seek to exploit the polarisation effect, there are a number of 
countervailing forces. These include, to mention but a few: the different orientations 
and interests within an ethnic group, which may also polarise increasingly as 
violence increases; the inter-ethnic enmeshment of economic interests and 
bureaucratic structures; internal regional competition which, because of the mixed 
nature of settlement-areas, cannot be reduced to simple ethnic terms; large 
numbers of people with bi-ethnic or multi-ethnic loyalties, resulting either from 
origin, mobility, or family ties; and, last but not least, the dynamics of 
modernization, which generally produces winners and losers in all ethnic groups 
and secondary parties to the conflict. 
The reality of ethnopolitical conflicts therefore involves not only two parties 
with opposing stances or interests, but also a spectrum of political-cum-social 
movements lying between the two. A good illustration of this spectrum is provided 
by the majority–minority conflict between Romanians and Hungarians in Romania.  
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For simplicity’s sake, only three levels are considered here: the partisan, the semi-
partisan, and the non-partisan. Peace work in this case is a task that presents itself 
on all three levels — and is by no means the responsibility of non-partisan forces 
alone. 
The most important ‘partisan’ actors in the conflict are, on the one side, the 
government, with, behind it, the ex-nomenclatura party-grouping around President 
Iliescu, plus various other parties whose programmes have a strongly nationalist 
accent; on the other side is the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians (DAHR). At 
bottom, the conflict is about two differing conceptions of the state: on the one hand, 
that of a unified nation-state in which only the Romanian nation/nationality is 
acknowledged as having a constituent character, whilst the Hungarian minority 
represents a ‘cohabitee’ population; on the other, a multi-ethnic polity in which 
national minorities are also acknowledged as constituent communities and are 
accorded the right to personal and regional autonomy. 
These conflicting conceptions of the state will not be resolved in the near 
future. What is more, given the crisis precipitated by transformation, drumming up 
support by means of nationalist propaganda will continue to be a politically 
‘worthwhile’ activity within the Romanian party-spectrum. Despite this, or perhaps 
because of it, these actors are confronted with an immediate peace-related task, 
albeit one that is unevenly distributed between the majority and minority — the 
task, namely, of acknowledging the legitimate concerns of the other side. Such an 
acknowledgement is the very first prerequisite if there is to be any chance at all of 
entering into a constructive dialogue. It requires much more than a tactically 
motivated, externally demonstrative readiness to talk. It is unlikely to be achieved 
without a fairly long communication process and a quite deep understanding of the 
anxieties and fears of the other side. Hence, party representatives who take on this 
task — and there are now a number of them doing so in Romania — are making a 
crucial contribution to civilizing the conflict culture. 
The middle category of ‘semi-partisan actors’ is, by its very nature, not a 
clearly definable group of political parties or social movements. The term implies all 
those actors who, although classified as belonging more to this or that side by 
virtue of various ethnic criteria, themselves see ethnopolitical issues as playing only 
a subordinate role. They include a number of smaller parties joined in a ‘Democratic 
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Convention’ in opposition to the government, as well as various business and 
professional organizations pressing for an immediate reform of the country.  
Mention should also be made here of the groups representing other ethnic 
minorities — though their numerical strength (except in the case of the Roma) is 
minimal. The initial function of these actors in peace terms is to create institutional 
links and channels of communication across the ethnic boundaries (‘bridge-
building’). In addition, they are helping in a crucial way to transform the conflict, by 
working for Romania’s political system to be modernized, thus relativizing the issue 
of ethnicity.  The proposed models for the decentralization of public administration 
that have emerged from this spectrum, and which could make the concept of 
regional autonomy resp. self-government more generally acceptable, are an 
example of this process. 
Internal ‘non-partisan’ actors are rare within an area of ethnopolitical tension, 
if ethnic membership itself is viewed as de facto partisanship. In situations of an 
acute conflict, it is therefore a great deal easier for external actors to be accepted as 
mediators or as impartial monitors in regard to adherence to international standards 
for the protection of minorities. In Romania, this is true both for multilateral 
institutions such as the OSCE and the Council of Europe and for NGOs such as the 
American ‘Project on Ethnic Relations’ (PER), which deals, amongst other things, 
with mediation between Romanian and Hungarian middle range leaders. In some 
cases, indigenous NGOs have sought to attain impartiality by systematically 
including representatives of both sides in the make-up of their memberships and 
leaderships. However, initiatives such as this, which run counter to the spirit of the 
times, find themselves on shaky ground and outside support can be decisive for 
their success. 
 
4 Peace Alliances and their Civil Agents 
 
 
Peace work aims to transform the conflict itself, and the manner in which it is 
conducted, in such a way that the danger of (renewed) violence is minimized and, at 
the same time, solutions are found to the vital concerns of all those involved. In 
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Figure 2, the contributions of civil actors to the accomplishment of this task are set 
out according to the phase of the conflict concerned and the degree of partiality of 
the actors. In order not to overload the diagram, we have highlighted only those 
roles and tasks in which partisan, semi-partisan, and non-partisan actors display 
distinct comparative advantages. 
 
 
Figure 2: Roles and Tasks of Peace Work in Situations of Conflict 
 
Features of 
Conflict 
 
Partisan actors 
 
Semi-partisan 
actors 
 
Non-partisan actors 
 
 
Latent / 
suppressed 
conflict 
• Creation of poli-
tical awareness 
and growing capa-
city for conflict of 
disadvanted 
groups 
• Acknowledgement 
by dominant 
group 
• Development 
policy aimed at 
reducing ethnic 
stratification 
• Promotion of 
multi-ethnic 
political 
structures 
• Bridge-building 
• Monitoring of human richts 
and the protection of mino-
rities 
• Encouraging creation of poli-
tical awareness, capacity for 
conflict engagement and 
handling 
• Acknowledgement of 
underprivileged parties 
 
 
 
No violence / 
Minimal violence 
• Mutual 
acknowledgement 
of legitimate 
concerns 
• Direct negotiat-
ions 
• Bridge-building 
• Promotion of 
multi-ethnic 
structures and 
loyalities 
• Monitoring 
• Promotion of constructive 
conflict resolution via round 
tables, pre-negotiations, 
seminars, mediation 
• Establishment of institutions 
involving all parties 
 
Wide scale 
violence 
• Working for non-
violent strategies 
• Seeking direct 
negotiations 
• Bridge-building 
• Refusal to join 
in the violence 
• Lobbying for 
non-violent 
strategies 
• Humanitarian 
work 
• Monitoring 
• Shuttle diplomacy and 
bridge-building 
• Pre-negotiations, seminar, 
mediation 
 
 
 
 
Post-violence 
• Acknowledgement 
of responsibility; 
reparation 
• Participation in 
reconciliation 
process 
• Bridge-building 
• Facilitation of 
reconciliation 
process 
• Social rehabili-
tation and re-
construction 
• Promotion of a 
“post-war 
peace-culture” 
• Monitoring 
• Facilitation of reconciliation 
process 
• Support in working through 
the traumas of the violence 
 
 
 21 
Overall, it is clear that the parties to the dispute are the decisive actors in the 
process of a conflict, and that it is therefore right that peace work should be based 
primarily on their actions and attitudes. However, it is also true that the way in 
which the conflict is conducted and the nature of its transformation cannot be 
understood without taking into consideration the semi-partisan forces and 
movements. Up to now, their role has not been sufficiently recognized and 
exploited. Lastly, it should be pointed out that impartiality implies two things: on 
the one hand, it stands for as objective a reminder/promotion of human rights, 
democracy, justice, and non-violence as possible; on the other hand, it offers an 
approach to understanding and mediation that is acceptable to all the parties.  Both 
aspects are necessary, even if they can quite easily be in competition with one 
another in particular cases. 
In the phase where the conflict is latent and suppressed, the task facing 
external, non-partisan actors is not primarily one of mediation, but one of support 
for the underprivileged group. In practice, however, these forms of intervention are 
not so far removed from one another, since the disadvantaged condition of 
minorities often only becomes manifest within the framework of engagement in or 
response to the conflict by state bodies or by members of the majority group. Thus, 
where attacks have been carried out against Roma, attempts are made, under the 
guidance of respected external figures, publicly to reconstruct the historical 
background to the events and to consult at the local level about how internal 
relations within the community can be improved and how external representation of 
the Roma’s interests can be made more effective. 
In relation to the aim of preventing violence in the second phase of a conflict 
— that of the open articulation of opposing positions and interests — the conflict 
researcher John Paul Lederach and the Secretary-General of International Alert, 
Kumar Rupesinghe, have coined the term ‘peace constituencies’.6 Behind this lies 
the idea that, by analogy with ‘war constituencies’ (in other words embodiments of 
belligerent socio-economic interests where military conflicts are fought out over a 
long period of time), peace-building also needs a broad base of social interests. For 
this task, the semi-partisan actors are of crucial importance — that is, all those 
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whose well-being in the community, in the economy, in the administration, in 
education, and at local-authority level is dependent on the conflict’s being dealt 
with by civil means. However, to mobilize these forces in the difficult conditions of a 
society in process of rapid change, and, if possible, to persuade them to engage in 
joint initiatives, is no easy task. An attempt of this kind has been made by civil 
actors from Moldova and separatist Trans Dniester who have come together to form 
a ‘Joint Committee for Conciliation and Democratization’. With the help of a 
community-work NGO from Northern Ireland, the committee managed to initiate 
joint local-authority action on transport, the economy, education, and health on 
either side of the dividing-line. 
In situations of violent conflict, semi-partisan as well as partisan actors are in 
danger of being drawn into the process of escalation and polarization. Under these 
conditions, external support for civil forces, as provided by the ‘Helsinki Citizens 
Assembly’ network, can be supremely important. It should, however, be noted that 
the good intentions of Western supporters of civil opposition can, none the less, 
bring indigenous actors into highly dangerous situations within the context of 
societies at war. Furthermore, the recent discussion about the unintended effects of 
civil humanitarian intervention in areas of war or crisis shows that there is not one 
major relief-measure that does not have some effect on the way the conflict is 
conducted. To what extent the wounds inflicted by war also carry within them the 
seeds of future violence depends in great measure, for example, on the amount of 
attention devoted to the psycho-social injuries suffered by victims of violence, 
refugees, and displaced persons.  Small indigenous aid-organizations such as the 
Belgrade-based NGO ‘Women in Black’ have done pioneering work in this regard. 
What opportunities for co-operation are offered to civil actors in post-war 
situations depends to a large extent on how much of a politically durable solution 
has really been achieved along with the ceasefire. In many cases, war has led to a 
deep split in society, one that the political peace-arrangement can only cover over 
very inadequately. To expect civil actors, in this situation, to assume responsibility, 
particularly for the revitalization of inter-ethnic links, is to demand far too much. In 
this phase above all, it is important to set realistic goals and gear oneself to a long 
                                                                                                                                                           
6John Paul Lederach: Conflict Transformation in Protracted Internal Conflicts: The Case for a Comprehensive 
Framework, in: Kumar Rupesinghe (ed.): Conflict Transformation. London et. al. 1995, pp. 201 - 222. 
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process of transition and healing. An important prerequisite if people in a divided 
society are to be prepared to work for inter-ethnic understanding is that the capacity 
for peace in each of the ethnic communities be strengthened. Thus, one decisive 
indicator of Serbian society’s capacity for peace will be how it deals with the 
integration of Serbian refugees and displaced persons from Croatia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina. 
Peace work in post-communist societies is inseparable from the creation of a 
new culture for dealing with political and social conflicts. To achieve this kind of 
conflict culture, the appropriate democratic and civil-society structures and 
qualified individuals are required. This should in no way be regarded as a task for 
marginal idealistic groups. Only when we succeed in making the process of 
“civilization” a concern both of the parties in dispute and of society as a whole will 
there be any chance for sustainable peace-building. 
